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Abstract
We continue our study of evolution in minority games by examining games in which
agents with poorly performing strategies can trade in their strategies for new ones from a
different strategy space.  In the context of the games discussed in this paper, this means
allowing for strategies that use information from different numbers of time lags, m.  We
find, in all the games we study, that after evolution, wealth per agent is high for agents
with strategies drawn from small strategy spaces (small m), and low for agents with
strategies drawn from large strategy spaces (large m). In the game played with N agents,
wealth per agent as a function of m is very nearly a step function.  The transition is at
m=mt, where mt≈mc-1.  Here mc is the critical value of m at which N agents playing the
game with a fixed strategy space (fixed m) have the best emergent coordination and the
best utilization of resources.  We also find that overall system-wide utilization of
resources is independent of N.  Furthermore, although overall system-wide utilization of
resources after evolution varies somewhat depending on some other aspects of the
evolutionary dynamics, in the best cases, utilization of resources is on the order of the
best results achieved in evolutionary games with fixed strategy spaces. Simple
explanations are presented for some of our main results.
2I.  Introduction
The problem of competition for scarce resources lies at the heart of many systems in the
social and biological sciences.  It is often the case that success in such a competition
requires an agent adopting strategies that make his actions distinct from those of other
players.  Thus, in trade, one wants to be a seller when most agents are buyers (so that the
price will be high) or a buyer when most agents are sellers (so that the price will be low).
Compounding this drive to be different is the observation that in many systems agents are
heterogeneous and generally adopt different strategies in their attempt to be different.
Furthermore, the actions of the agents affect their environment, so that future choices of
an agent in a heterogeneous population are conditioned by the past actions of the other
agents, and by that agent’s past experience in the context of the choices made by the
collective.
This general structure was encapsulated in a problem posed by Arthur1 which centered
around the problem of attending a popular bar on nights when Irish folk music was being
played at the bar.  Many people want to go to the bar on such nights, but no one wants to
go if there are more than a certain number of people at the bar, since then the place would
be too noisy and no one would be able to enjoy the Irish music.
Motivated by Arthur’s phrasing of the question, Challet and Zhang2 suggested a simple
model which has come to be known as the minority game, and which incorporates much
of the basic structure of the kind of problem posed by Arthur.  Versions of this model
have been studied,3,4,5,6,7.8.9,10and much of the basic structure has been explicated, if not
deeply understood.  In particular, and most remarkably, it has been established that in
games that are adaptive (but not evolutionary so that agents’ strategies are fixed for the
duration of the game), and in which agents can choose to exercise different strategies at
different moments of the game, there can be an emergent coordination among agents’
choices that leads to an optimum utilization of resources.3,4  The controlling parameter in
these games, z, is the ratio of the dimension of the strategy space from which the agents
draw their strategies, 2m, to the number of agents playing the game, N.  In these games,
agents’ strategies can use the publicly available information about which was the
minority group for the previous m time steps in order to make their predictions of what
will be the next minority group.  If z is of order one, then there is good emergent
coordination, and a good utilization of resources.  If  z is too small the agents’ actions
3become maladaptive leading to a very poor utilization of resources, and if z is too large,
overall resource utilization declines and approaches that of a collection of agents all of
whom make random decisions.
Given the remarkable structure of the adaptive, non-evolutionary game, it is natural to
ask what happens when evolutionary dynamics is included and agents are allowed to
change their strategies under selective pressure.  In examining the role of evolution, it is
important to distinguish between two different cases.  In the first, the strategy space
available to the agents is fixed, so that all strategies of all the agents have the same value
of m.  Poorly performing agents can replace their strategies, but the new strategies must
always be drawn from the same strategy space, and therefore have the same value of m.
In the second case, the strategy space is allowed to vary.  Different agents may possess
strategies drawn from different strategy spaces (i.e. associated with different values of
m).  Moreover, poorly performing agents may replace their strategies with a different
value of m.
The first case has been studied in a companion paper6.  In that work we found that
evolution typically improves system-wide utilization of resources.  At the same time,
many of the most intriguing general features of the adaptive, non-evolutionary games
persist when evolution is incorporated.  In particular, the best overall coordination and
utilization of resources still appears at the same value of z (≡zc).  Moreover, the scaling
structure observed in non-evolutionary games also persists, although the precise form of
the scaling function is different.
While the results of Ref. 6 are very interesting, there are clearly many situations in which
restricting all agents to use strategies from the same strategy space, or restricting their
evolutionary modifications to be drawn from the same strategy space is unrealistic.  In
this paper we extend our study of evolution in minority games to games in which
different agents may have strategies drawn from different strategy spaces, and in which
evolution may change the strategy space from which an agent’s strategies are drawn.  In
these games we find some surprising and robust features, notably that after evolution, the
wealthiest agents are those whose strategies are drawn from the smallest strategy spaces
(i.e. the smallest values of m).  This is quite a counter-intuitive result.  In addition, we
find that for a given number of agents, N, the average agent wealth as a function of the
size of the strategy space used by that agent (i.e., as a function of m), is roughly a step
function.  The step transition from wealthy to poor agents occurs at a value of m =
4mt≈mc-1, where mc is critical value of m at which the system achieves best emergent
coordination for N agents in the games played with fixed m.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows:  In the next section, we describe the
evolutionary games studied in the paper, including a description of the various
evolutionary algorithms used.  In Section III we describe the most important results of
our study.  Section IV is devoted to some simple explanations of the results of Section III.
The paper ends with Section V which contains a summary and discussion of our results.
II.  Evolutionary games with variable m
As in most previous work on minority games, we consider here a game with a fixed
number of agents, N.  At each time step of the game, each agent must join one of two
groups (labeled 0 or 1).  Each agent in the minority group at a given time step is rewarded
with a point, each agent in the majority group gets nothing.  In these games, the agents
make their choice (to join group 0 or group 1) by following the prediction of a strategy.
Strategies make their predictions by using information drawn from a set of common,
publicly available information provided to all the agents at each time step.  In the games
studied here, that information is the list of which were the minority groups for the most
recent past m time steps.  Thus, a strategy is a look-up table with 2 columns and 2m rows.
The left-hand column contains a list of all 2m possible common signals that the strategy
can receive at a given time step of the game corresponding to the 2m possible sequences
of m 0’s and 1’s.  For each such signal, the right-hand column contains a 0 or 1 which is
that strategy’s prediction of which will be the minority group in response to the given
signal.
At the beginning of the game, each agent is randomly assigned s such strategies (in
general, different, random sets of strategies for different agents).  At each time step of the
game, an agent must choose which of his s strategies to use.  In the games studied in this
paper, each agent keeps a running tally of how well each of his s strategies has done at
predicting the correct minority group for all times since the beginning of the game.  He
then chooses to use that strategy that is currently doing the best.  Ties among strategies
may be broken in a variety of ways, the simplest being a random choice among the tied
strategies.
5Consider minority games in which different agents play with strategies that have different
values of m.  In the evolutionary versions of these games, agents with poorly performing
strategies may also change the m-value of their strategies in response to selective
pressure.   For simplicity we consider the case in which all of an agent’s s strategies have
the same value of m at each time step of the game.  (I.e., a given agent may not
simultaneously use strategies of different m.)  At the beginning of the game, strategies are
distributed to the N agents so that nm(t=0) agents each have s (random) strategies of
memory m.  Clearly Σnm(t)=N.  In all the games described here, we restrict ourselves to a
universe in which 1≤m≤16.  We have studied games with various initial distributions of
agents, nm(t=0).  The main results we present below are independent of nm(t=0), although
some details, such as rates of convergence do depend on nm(t=0).  For specificity, unless
stated otherwise, nm(t=0) is generally independent of m for the results reported below.
To complete the specification of the system, we must specify the evolutionary dynamics.
There are many different ways to define evolutionary dynamics consistent with the notion
of selective pressure.  We have chosen to look at several which are associated with
removal of poorly performing strategies.  In this paper, we have not incorporated effects
such as incremental mutation or reproduction.  Studies including those dynamics will be
reported elsewhere11.  As we shall explain below, we find that some central features of
our results are independent of the details of the evolutionary processes that we have
studied.  We believe that these features may be yet more general.
To evolve our system, we define a time, τ, which is the duration of one generation.
During τ time steps, the agents’ strategies do not change.  At the end of τ time steps, we
rank the agents by wealth accumulated during that generation (i.e., how many times they
have been in the minority group).  We define a “poor” agent to be one whose wealth is in
the lowest p percentile of agent wealth.  We call p the "poverty level".  We randomly
choose half the agents whose wealth is in the lowest p percent of agents, and replace their
s strategies with s new strategies.  The new strategies do not necessarily have the same
value of m as the strategies they replaced, so that nm is in general a function of the
generation number.  Those agents whose strategies are not replaced maintain the relative
rankings of their strategies from one generation to the next. New strategies given to an
agent at the beginning of a generation to replace poorly performing strategies start out
with equal rankings.  The game is played for an additional τ time steps, and the
evolutionary process is repeated.  In the results reported here, each agent has s=2
strategies, τ =20,000 time steps, and p is set so that the impoverished group is defined as
6either the poorest 10%, 20% or 40% of the population.  We have studied two variants of
these evolutionary dynamics.  In the first, variant A, an agent chosen for strategy
replacement is given strategies of any memory, m, with equal probability.  In the second,
variant B, an agent chosen for strategy replacement, whose strategies have memory m, is
given strategies with memory m+1 or m-1, with equal probability.12 Using these
parameter ranges and the two evolutionary dynamics, we have studied a variety of games
with N=101, 201, 401, and 801 agents run for a total of between 300 and 1800
generations (6 million to 36 million time steps).  In all, we have performed about 140
experiments, the results of which are used in this paper.
III.  Results
In these games we will look at both the system-wide utilization of resources, and at the
distribution of wealth to the agents.  Since the strategies of different agents can have
different values of m, it will be particularly interesting to see how wealth is distributed as
a function of m.
A.  System-Wide Performance
We turn first to a description of the collective utilization of resources by the system.  As
in previous studies of minority games, it is convenient to consider, as an inverse measure
of the goodness of resource utilization, σ, the standard deviation of the number of agents
belonging to group 1.  The smaller σ is, the larger the typical minority is, and so the more
points are awarded to the population in toto.  In previous studies of minority games, we
have found that σ2/N had very interesting scaling properties, and so it is the quantity we
will consider here.
We have performed a variety of experiments with different values of N, p, and T, the
total number of time steps in the game, using both variants of the evolutionary dynamics
described above.  In Figs. 1-3 we plot σ2/N, averaged over the final 100 generations of
the game, as a function of N for games played with different values of p.  In each graph
we have used different symbols to denote which of the two variants of evolutionary
dynamics, A or B, were used.  Note three major features of these figures:
1. σ2/N is approximately independent of N for each variant A and B.
2. For smaller p, σ2/N is lower for variant A than for variant B, but that difference
disappears for p=40%.
3.  σ2/N increases with increasing p.
7As we shall discuss in the next section, observation 1 is a generalization of the scaling
observed in the fixed m games3,4,6.  Deviations from the N independence seen most
strongly in Fig. 1 are most likely due to slow convergence and small values of T for some
of the runs, as we shall discuss below.  Observation 2 is most likely due to different rates
of convergence for the two different variants.  Indeed, lower values of σ2/N for variant B
(especially for p=10%) are typically achieved for longer runs.  Observation 3 mirrors a
similar dependence on p in the case of evolutionary games with a fixed strategy space5
for values of m≠mc.
It is also interesting to compare these values of σ2/N with those obtained in games with a
fixed strategy space.  In Fig. 4 we indicate some typical values of σ2/N for the variable
strategy space games played here, and compare them with values for games played with a
fixed strategy space.  The results presented in this figure for the variable strategy space
games are those obtained using variant A of the evolutionary dynamics, since
convergence is faster, particularly for small p.  In general, σ2/N is quite low for the
variable strategy space games. σ2/N is much smaller than the non-evolutionary, fixed
strategy space game, even for m=mc.  However, σ2/N for the variable strategy space
games is not generally as small as that of the evolutionary, fixed strategy space games at
m=mc.   For the latter, σ2/N is about 0.0245, (nearly) independent of p. When p is small
(in our case p=10%), σ2/N is approximately equal to the value achieved in the
evolutionary fixed m game at m=mc,6 but is larger for larger p.
B.  Agent Wealth
To help understand the nature of evolution in these games, we consider how nm and wm,
the average wealth per agent accumulated in a given generation as a function of m, varies
as the system evolves.  In Fig. 5 we present a sequence of snapshots of one game
illustrating the variation over time of both nm and wm.  In this example, N=401, the
poverty level is set at 10% (so that about 20 agents change their strategies at the end of
each generation), and the evolutionary dynamics is variant A.  The initial distribution of
agents among the m-bins, nm(t=0), is uniform (except for the last bin).  This example was
run for a total of 600 generations.  The plots show nm and wm every 30 generations.  The
first snapshot, labeled generation 0 is nm and wm at the end of the first generation, before
any evolution has taken place.  In this and the next figure, wm is plotted in a normalized
form to highlight the relative values of average wealth among agents in different m-bins.
Thus, the maximum wm in a given generation is set to two and the minimum is set to one.
8Note two important features late in evolution:
1. Average agent wealth as a function of m, wm, is described by a near step function
with high wealth accruing to agents with small m.  In this example, the transition
from large values of wm to small values of wm occurs at a value of m≈7.
2. Most agents have small values of m. nm also falls from relatively large to relatively
small values at  m≈7.
The step function behavior of wm is a very robust feature of evolution with a variable
strategy space, and appears after a sufficiently long time in all our runs, regardless of the
values of N, p, T, the variant of the evolutionary dynamics used, or the initial distribution
of agents in m-bins (nm(t=0)).  The qualitative property that nm changes from large values
for small m to small values for large m is also robust.  However, the precise nature of the
dependence of nm for small m depends on the nature of the evolutionary dynamics.  For
example, in fig. 6 we show another example of evolution in the same format as Fig. 5, but
this time for N=401, p=10% and variant B of the dynamics  In this figure, snapshots are
shown every 90 generations, due to the slower convergence of this variant of the
dynamics.  Note that late in evolution wm is still a step function with a transition at a
value of m≈6, nm is large for m≤6 and small for m>6, but the functional form of nm for
m≤6 is different than in Fig. 5.
It is interesting to note that in generation 0 in both Figs. 5 and 6, wm peaks at about m=6.
This is a typical feature of these kinds of runs, and is in marked contrast to the behavior
of wm later after evolution.  What is particularly striking about this is that agents in the
low m bins initially do relatively poorly.  Nevertheless, evolution (in combination with
phase space arguments, as we shall explain below) ultimately selects solutions in which
agents in the low m bins are wealthy.
The step function-like behavior of wm after evolution can be characterized by the value of
m, mt, at which the transition from wealthy to poor agents occurs.  Since wm is
monotonic, we define mt as a matter of principle to be that value of m at which wm is half
its maximum value.  However, since we have restricted ourselves to games with integer
value of m, we can operationally define mt to be the first value of m, such that wm is less
than half its maximum value.  We denote this operationally determined value by tm~ .  In
Fig. 7 we show a semi-log plot of tm~ , averaged over several runs, as a function of N for
games played with variant A of the dynamics.  It is clear that there is a linear relationship
9between tm~  and log N.  Since there is also a linear relationship between mc and log N in
the fixed strategy space games, this suggests that there may be simple relationship
between mt and mc.  We find that mt≈mc-1, and 21~ −≈ ct mm .  Recall that for N=101
agents, mc≈5.2, and increases by one everytime N is doubled.  The results shown in Fig. 7
are thus consistent with the relation 21
~
−≈ ct mm .  These relationships will be discussed
further in the next section.
Another very robust feature of these games has to do with the wealth distribution of
agents within m-bins.  In Fig. 8 we show a typical scatter plot of agent wealth as a
function of m for the 300th generation of a game played with N=401,p=10%, and variant
A of the evolutionary dynamics.  We see that, although wm is roughly independent of m
for m<mt, the distribution of wealth within each m-bin broadens as m→mt from below.
This is a qualitatively robust finding and occurs in all of our simulations, independent of
parameter settings and independent of the variant of the evolutionary algorithm.
IV. Understanding the Results
The most robust features of minority games with variable strategy spaces are
1. After evolution, σ2/N is generally independent of N
2. After evolution, σ2/N is quite low, but, except for small values of p, is generally not
as small as the value obtained for the evolutionary fixed strategy space game at
m=mc.
3. After evolution, agents tend to use strategies with small values of m, so that m-bins
with m<mt are highly populated, but m-bins with m>mt are sparsely populated.
4. Average agent wealth in a given m-bin, wm, is roughly a step-function, being high,
and roughly independent of m for m<mt, and low for m>mt.
5. For a given number of agents, N, the transition from wealthy to poor agents occurs at
a value mt≈mc-1 (operationally, 21~ −≈ ct mm ), where mc is the critical value of m at
which σ2/N takes on its lowest value for the fixed strategy-space game played with N
agents.
6. The spread in agent wealth within an m-bin increases as m→mt from below.
At first sight these general results seem somewhat surprising for two reasons.  First, given
the fact that selection should work to improve individual and, possibly, system-wide
performance, one might have expected that the system would evolve so that all agents
would play with strategies with memory mc.  In addition, given that this is not the state to
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which the system evolves, it is furthermore surprising that the wealthiest agents are those
with small memory (m<mt).13
To understand this general structure, it is important to recognize a general principle
which seems to be at work in these systems:  The important quantity in determining the
overall efficacy of the system is the ratio of the dimension of the strategy space available
to the agents divided by the number of agents.  When this ratio is about 1/3 the system
does best at distributing resources.  This is a very stable feature of minority games and is
robust to many changes in the system including changes in the nature of the information
set14 and the introduction of evolution in games with fixed strategy spaces6, or even the
introduction of exogenous random driving signals.9  In fact, the same principle is at work
here.  To a good approximation, after evolution, most agents are distributed in a global
strategy space whose dimension is approximately 2mc
 
which is the critical dimension of
the strategy space for N agents.  To see this, note that after evolution nearly all agents
have values of m≤mt.  But the dimension of the strategy space for memory m is 2m so the
total effective strategy space available to the agents is (at least approximately) the direct
product space of all the strategy spaces associated with memory m≤mt, and so has
dimension cct
t
mmm
m
m
m 222222 1
1
≈−=−=
+
=
∑ .  Thus, evolution does indeed move the
system toward a critical value of the effective available strategy space, but the qualitative
nature of the space is much different than in the game restricted to a single value of m.15
The observation that σ2/N is independent of N (Figs. 1-3) and that mt (and tm~ ) is
proportional to log N (Fig. 7), is the analogue in the multi-m game of the scaling with z in
the fixed m minority game:  In the multi-m game, the system automatically picks out the
value mt which plays the role of mc in these games.  As for the difference between mt and
tm
~
, we note that the operational definition states that tm~  is defined as the first m bin after
wm has fallen to at least half its maximum value.  This biases the definition of mt by +½ ,
thus producing the relationship between the operationally defined value tm~ , and mc.  The
theoretically interesting quantity is, nevertheless, mt.
Given this, however, we can still ask why the system evolves toward this state, and not
toward the state in which all agents sit in the strategy space of memory mc?  The reason is
that there are many more states accessible to the evolutionary dynamics that have a
distribution of agents in bins with m<mt than there are states with all agents in the single
m-bin with m=mc.  This is fundamentally a phase space or entropic argument.  Recall that
under these evolutionary dynamics, an agent whose strategies are altered moves first to a
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different m-bin with some probability (which depends on the variant of the evolutionary
dynamics), and then chooses strategies within this m-bin.  Under such a scenario, it is
clear that the probability of finding a large number of agents in the single m bin with
m=mc is a priori much lower than the probability to find agents distributed in a range of
m-bins.  The minority dynamics is generally effective at distributing resources if the
dimension of the effective strategy space is close to optimal, regardless of the nature of
that strategy space.  It is, therefore, much easier for the system to evolve to one of the
many states in which agents are distributed in a variety of m-bins whose total dimension
is ~2mc, rather than the single state in which all agents have memory mc.16  Of course,
strict entropy also favors the (in general many) values of m for m>mc.  But since there are
not enough agents to effectively coordinate choices, agents in those bins will not fare
well, and occupancy there will be selected against by the evolutionary dynamics.
Although the evolutionary dynamics used here are clearly sensible and reasonable (and
probably applicable to a wide variety of real systems in the social and biological
sciences), there may be other evolutionary dynamics which favor evolution toward the
singular state of occupancy at m=mc.  For example, if the agent’s assignments into m-
bins is weighted in some way (say, by either the dimension of the strategy space
associated with that value of m, or by the number of strategies in that m-bin), then agents
would be favorably placed in bins with large values of m.  On the other hand, if they were
placed in bins with too large a value of m, their performance would be poor, since they
would not be able to coordinate their strategy choices well.  Under such dynamics, it
might be possible for the system to be driven to the state in which nearly all agents
occupy the bin with m=mc.  The relevance of such dynamics will, of course, depend on
the particular system being studied.  But in any case, if the evolutionary dynamics is not
artificially too constrained, we expect that the system will tend to a state in which the
ratio of the dimension of the effective strategy space to the number of agents is about 1/3.
Although the ratio of the effective strategy space to the number of agents is close to
optimal, overall performance of the system, as measured by σ2/N is, for most values of p,
not as good as in the evolutionary fixed m case with m=mc.  The reason is that there is
some continuing exploratory overhead.  Since poorly performing agents will sometimes
choose values of m>mt, those agents will not be able to coordinate their choices very
well, thus lowering system-wide performance.  To see that this is the origin of the
lowered performance, note first that the wealth of agents with m>mt is about what one
would have for agents making random choices, thus indicating that, to a first
12
approximation, those agents are choosing randomly between their two strategies.  Since
the wealthy agents and the poor agents fall into two distinct groups (m<mt and m>mt,
respectively), we can ask, what the system wide performance would be if we included
only those agents with m<mt in the calculation of σ2/N.  Typically, we find that the value
of σ2/N so computed is roughly consistent with the value of σ2/N at z=zc after evolution,
for the fixed m case.  Specifically, let xl be the number of agents in the minority group
with m<mt and xg be the number of agents in the minority group with m>mt.  Also, let Ng
(Nl) be the number of agents with m>mt, (m<mt) and let ξ = Ng/N.  Then, it is easy to
show that
σ2 = 〈(xl + xg – N/2)2〉 = σl2 + σg2 (4.1)
where
σl
2
 = 〈(xl  – Nl /2)2〉 and σg2 = 〈(xg  – Ng /2)2〉 (4.2)
so that 
σ2/N = (1-ξ)σl2/Nl + ξσg2/Ng. (4.3)
Because the agents with m>mt are unable to coordinate their choices, their average
wealth is close to what one would expect for agents in the random choice game (RCG). It
is reasonable, therefore, to use as the value for σg2/Ng 0.25, which is what we would find
in the RCG.   If we then use the observed value of σ2/N for the multi-m game, and the
observed value for ξ, we can solve for σl2/Nl.  Doing this, we find that the computed
value of σl2/Nl is consistent with the value of σ2/N at z=zc after evolution, for the fixed m
case.  Thus, the lowered performance of the system in the multi-m case is due to the
evolutionary, exploratory overhead which at any time is expressed in the agents with
m>mt.
Another robust feature of our results is that fact, demonstrated in Fig. 8, that the spread in
agent wealth increases as m approaches mt from below, even though wm stays roughly
constant.  The simple explanation for this is that as m increases the heterogeneity of the
agents and their strategies also increases leading to a wider distribution in agent wealth.
Of greater interest, of course, is the observation that wm is roughly independent of m for
m<mt.  This just reflects the fact that all agents with m<mt are able to reasonably
coordinate their minority choices since they dwell in an effective strategy space of
roughly the right size (dimension cm2 ) for best utilization of resources.17
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V. Summary and Discussion
Summary
The main results of our investigation are that evolution in a mixed strategy space setting
leads to states in which the most wealthy agents populate the lows m-bins.  For a given
total number of agents, N, the wealth per agent in an m-bin, wm, is roughly a step
function with a transition occurring at m=mt ≈ mc-1, where mc is the critical value of m at
which  σ2/N is smallest in the fixed m game.  This means that the effective size of the
strategy space occupied by most of the agents is about cm2 .  Consequently, evolution in
the minority game with variable strategy spaces for the agents typically leads to states
which are critical in the sense that the ratio of the dimension of the effective strategy
space to the number of agents playing the game is about 1/3, as in the fixed-m cases.  In
addition, after evolution, σ2/N is generally independent of N, and, once exploratory
overhead is accounted for, σ2/N for the variable strategy space game has a value
consistent with that found in the evolutionary fixed m game at m=mc.
Discussion
The most remarkable features of our result are the twin robust findings that the agents
that do the best are those with the lowest memory, and that, at the same time, the system
evolves to a state that is critical in the sense that it is still characterized by the same
effective critical size of the strategy space seen in the simpler games played with fixed m.
The universality of the critical value of the strategy space is most impressive.  But
equally impressive is the fact that the system can manifest that criticality in a surprising
way.  After evolution, the agents and their strategies look nothing like the population in
the fixed m game.  In the multi-m case, wealthy agents are those with the simplest
strategies, and the population is likewise distributed primarily in the low-m bins.  On the
other hand, agents with large m strategies do poorly.  (We call this the “too clever by
half” phenomenon.)  In the fixed m case, at m=mc agents, perforce, all have the same
memory and respond to exactly the same set of signals. Nevertheless, there is a deep
commonality between these very different looking systems.  In both cases the dimension
of the effective strategy space is the same for a given number of agents and overall
system performance is comparable.
We also see in our work consequences of evolutionary dynamics that are well known in
other systems.  First, there is the exploratory overhead which in our system manifests
itself in the agents with memory m>mt, and leads to some degradation of overall system
performance.  Second, the rate of convergence to a moderately stable macroscopic
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configuration varies, depending on values of some evolutionary parameters.  In our case,
convergence rates vary with the poverty level, p, as well as with the variant of
evolutionary dynamics used.  Also, the details of the state to which the system evolves
may depend to some extent on the initial conditions and on the evolutionary dynamics.
For example, in the experiments discussed here, if the initial population of agents is
concentrated in one m-bin with m>mt, and if the evolutionary dynamics allows only
changes of ±1 in an agent’s memory with each generation, then there appears to be a
tendency for nm to increase as m approaches mt from below.  (It is, of course, possible
that this is also a transient effect, but we have seen such a feature persist in runs of up to
900 generations.)
Our results also raise deep questions about the interaction between the fundamental
principles that govern evolution and the characteristics of the space of possible outcomes.
Our work here, coupled with previous work on the minority game, suggests that there
may be an important and fundamental principle at work in the evolution of systems in
which adaptive agents compete for scarce resources.  Namely, while the rules of the game
are set up to ensure that agents seek to optimize their own utility, evolution also pushes
the system to a configuration in which the global good is optimized (or nearly so).  We
emphasize that this seems to be a non-trivial consequence of evolution in the systems we
have studied here, and we speculate that it is a very general and important priniciple of
evolutionary adaptive competition.  On the other hand, the specific way in which the
underlying priniciple is manifested in a specific situation may depend on a various
parameters governing the dynamics of that situation.  For example, in the minority game
we have studied, one important feature of the underlying strategy space is that there are
many more ways to distribute agents over several low m bins than to distribute them all
in one m=mc bin.  This is a major reason why systems described in this paper evolve
toward states with highly populated low m bins.  More generally, the nature of the phase
space is likely to be one important factor channeling the dynamics of all evolutionary
systems.  Other factors that are likely to be important in determining the precise nature of
the evolved state include the payoff structure18, developmental and historical constraints19
and various dynamical relationships among agent types20.
Our study of evolution in minority games has helped highlight what we believe to be a
general priniciple that may play an important role in evolving social and biological
systems.  But there is much yet to be done in order to understand more deeply the
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generality and nature of this principle, as well as the ways in which it can be manifest and
its limitations.
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Figure Captions
Fig. 1. σ2/N as a function of N for p=10%.  Crosses indicate games played with variant A
of the evolutionary dynamics, and circles indicate results for games played with variant
B.
Fig. 2. σ2/N as a function of N for p=20%.  Crosses indicate games played with variant A
of the evolutionary dynamics, and circles indicate results for games played with variant
B.
Fig. 3. σ2/N as a function of N for p=40%.  Crosses indicate games played with variant A
of the evolutionary dynamics, and circles indicate results for games played with variant
B.
Fig. 4.  A comparison of values of σ2/N for games with variable and fixed strategy
spaces.  In this graph results are plotted for games played wih N=101.  The results plotted
for the variable strategy space games are for variant A of the evolutionary dynamics.
Similar values are obtained for other values of N, and indicated in Figs. 1-3.
Fig. 5  wm and nm every 30 generations for a game played with N=401 agents, p=10%
and variant A of the evolutionary dynamics.  The initial conditions are that nm(t=0) is
uniform for 1≤m≤16 (with the exception of bin 16), which comprises the universe of this
simulation.  Values for wm are scaled so that the maximum value in any generation is set
to two and the minimum value is set to one.  Generation 0 shows the results after the first
generation of the run, before any evolution.
Fig. 6  wm and nm every 90 generations for a game played with N=401 agents, p=10%
and variant B of the evolutionary dynamics. The initial conditions are that nm(t=0) is
uniform for 1≤m≤16 (with the exception of bin 16), which comprises the universe of this
simulation.  Values for wm are scaled so that the maximum value in any generation is set
to two and the minimum value is set to one.  Generation 0 shows the results after the first
generation of the run, before any evolution..
Fig. 7. tm~ , the operationally defined version of mt, versus N on a semi-log plot.  These
results are for variant A of the dynamics.  The values shown represent averages over a
total of 24 runs (4 each for N=101 and N=801, and 8 each for N=201 and N=401)
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ranging in duration from 6 million to 18 million time steps (300 to 900 generations).  For
12 of the runs p=20%, and for 12 of the runs p=40%.
Fig. 8.  Typical scatter plot of agent wealth as a function of m.  Shown is a scatter plot for
the 300th generation of a run in which N=401, p=10%, and the evolutionary dynamics is
variant A.  Note that in the low m bins there are many more agents clustered near
w=10,000 than there are outliers, or than there are agents in the high m bins.  This is not
necessarily apparent on this figure since many black dots representing different agents are
superimposed on each other near w=10,000.
